Al Shabaab has been a persistent threat to Somalia and neighbouring countries for almost two decades, despite consistent counter-terrorism operations waged by the Somali Forces, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), now African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces, and International Allies. In response to this threat and to seize the opportunity presented by the uprising of the Macawisley militia combined with the previously agreed end of the current ATMIS, the Somali government declared ‘a total war ‘to liberate the country from Al Shabaab in August 2022. However, .....
Grappling with the ongoing conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan finds itself at a crucial crossroads. This conflict, and the political, economic, military and security, social, and external risks facing the country, can impact its future and that of the region it is situated in. In this state stability and scenario modelling brief, I outline the risks facing the country and explore four scenarios that could potentially develop in the country in the foreseeable future: The Sudanese Military succeeds in expanding its complete control over the country; ....
There is not just one reason for the conflict. Rather, a combination of fac- tors has led to the armed uprising in Lasanod that started at the end of December 2022 and is still continuing at the time of writing (June 2023). It is very likely, indeed, that very serious military clashes between the Soma- liland army (which is strongly backed by members of the Isaaq clan family and hardly includes any members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans anymore) and Harti forces (which is a clan coalition including fighters from the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Majeerteen and other clans) will take place in the near future. This report will first outline the long-term and structural factors involved in the conflict. It then covers some immediate factors that led to the armed uprising in Lasanod. In addition, the report discusses three turning points that, together with the long-term and immediate factors,....
EU action and engagement in Africa has traditionally been centred around a ‘triple nexuses of humanitarian assistance, development aid, and peace. In this context, the EU has assisted the establishment of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Architecture in 2002 and supported the deployment of an AU peacekeeping force in Somalia – the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) – and its successor – the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). As such....
End of December 2022, a young politician was assassinated in Lasanod. This was the most recent targeted killing in a long series of similar attacks, which had not been prevented or at least followed up and solved by the Somaliland authorities in town. In reaction, Lasanod residents started protesting against the prevailing insecurity in town. This escalated into .....
The election of a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud in Somalia, coupled with a recent statement from one of the Harakat Al-Shabaab’s leaders, Mahad Warsame Qalley Karate have again put negotiations with Al-Shabaab on the agenda. The war against Al-Shabaab has developed into a ‘forever war’, where the biggest losers are Somali’s civilian population. Negotiating is .....
The Somali electoral process is nearing its end. The process has been plagued by postponements and totalitarian tendencies and is not the ‘one person one vote’ process that many hoped for. It has been determined by a combination of clan factors and financial resources, but also real political agendas, abilities to build alliances, and political images. It is not a pure clan-based process, nor is it a process determined by money alone—it is not ‘all about the money’. What we see is rather a hybrid system where many factors interact. The hybrid system has, for all its faults, in the past ensured that opposition can- candidates have had a chance to win elections in Somalia, which stands in contrast to many of its neighboring countries. In order for this to continue to function in the long run, continued checks and balances, including in the federal system, are needed, and the quality of processes becomes more important than artificial benchmarks.
The Biden Administration recently released three important strategies: the Strategy
toward sub-Saharan Africa (STSA), the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the
National Defense Strategy (NDS).This policy brief explores these strategies, what
they mean, and their potential impact in the Horn of Africa. We argue that these
strategy papers aside from the STSA, both the NSS and NDS largely ignore Africa.
The shift in focus of these new US strategies is rather dramatic, and it is away
from Africa, the US-Africa summit notwithstanding. Yet they indicate that we
should expect the United States to engage more in mitigating climate change in
the Horn of Africa, and that its strategies are to a certain degree aligned with
Kenyan foreign policy goals in the region. Further.....Policy Brief
A Near End to Somalia’s Election Conundrum?
READ MOREPolicy Brief
A Near End to Somalia’s Election Conundrum?
READ MOREReport
There is not just one reason for the conflict. Rather, a combination of factors has led to the armed uprising in Lasanod that started at the end of December 2022 and is still continuing at the time of writing (June 2023).
READ MOREComming soon
Subscribe to the Rapri.org Mailing List